2015年8月21日 · I agree that to define metaphysics as the study of the "nature of reality" is completely inadequate. It is a shallow definition, misleading, arguably circular. You leave us with a very complicated mission, though, if you expect the answer to this question to be given in pragmatic ("black and white") terms. The first thing that comes to my mind ...

2016年9月1日 · The laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle are traditionally considered to be logical laws, not metaphysical, neither are physical laws metaphysical, and cogito ergo sum is not even a law (Leibniz called it a "fact of reason"). Metaphysical truths are usually truths that predicate the "true being", if one believes in such a thing.

2020年5月30日 · Your definition of metaphysical is a diminished connotation of the philosophical meaning. All it actually refers to is, 'that which is real'. By 'real' in this case is meant a thing whose existence is 'necessary', unlike people, objects and things which are 'contingent'.

2014年5月17日 · Therefore, we know that (p ∨ ¬p) is metaphysically necessary. Metaphysical possibility is defined in an analogous manner: Definition 5. (Metaphysical possibility m). Formula φ of propositional modal language is metaphysically possible (symbolically: m φ) iff it is true in Carnapian models at some valuation. Example.

2023年3月24日 · There is no definition of physicalism that is not either false, or allows the opposed concepts to be part of physicalism". The tangles that ontological naturalism gets into, and the clear incoherence of its use of "supernatural", strongly suggest that the useful philosophic approach to both terms should be to use them only epistemologically.

As you say, really there is no difference. We may choose to study this or that area of metaphysics but by its very nature all the approaches to metaphysics converge. It would not be possible to solve ontology without solving all significant metaphysical problems. There is a difference between the definitions but as you observe it doesn't matter ...

2024年12月8日 · I believe there is no good definition and sound theory behind the philosophical understanding of the metaphysical, other than that it is something, in very generic terms, opposite to physicalism. Physicalism as well, does not have a big names in philosophy, building its theoretical foundation.

2024年12月8日 · Clear enough definition (no matter how general it is) of physicality that'll distinct between physical and non-physical, or, will provide boundaries of physicality. A definition of physicality that'll account for the history of physics, the changes on how we viewed physics and non-physics. Not a dualistic solution.

2024年9月29日 · Metaphysical necessity, possibility, and impossibility, were basically invented by Kripke as an effort to patch rationality in the face of the realization of the radical contingency of our world. A contingent world is only explorable through empiricism, not reasoning from logical necessities and impossibilities and reasoning is of little use to ...

2023年7月10日 · Some metaphysical physicalists may hold to that, while others don't. Their position on metaphysical physicalism doesn't make a claim one way or the other about what we can theoretically know about emotions. Linguistical physicalism seems to be a subset of metaphysical physicalism, rather than being distinct from it, as you're presenting it.